We suggest a new view of secretory and membrane protein folding that emphasizes the role of pathways of biogenesis in generating functional and conformational heterogeneity. In this view, heterogeneity results from action of accessory factors either directly binding specific sequences of the nascent chain, or indirectly, changing the environment in which a particular domain is synthesized. Entrained by signaling pathways, these variables create a combinatorial set of necessary‐but‐not‐sufficient conditions that enhance synthesis and folding of particular alternate, functional, conformational forms. We (...) therefore propose that protein conformation is productively regulated by the cell during translocation across the endoplasmic reticulum (ER), a concept that may account for currently poorly understood aspects of physiological function, natural selection, and disease pathogenesis. BioEssays 24:741–748, 2002. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

We sought to evaluate whether health care professionals’ viewpoints differed on the role of ethics committees and hospitals in the resolution of clinical ethical dilemmas based on practice location. We conducted a survey study from December 21, 2013 to March 15, 2014 of health care professionals at six hospitals. The survey consisted of eight clinical ethics cases followed by statements on whether there was a role for the ethics committee or hospital in their resolution, what that role might be and (...) case specific queries. Respondents used a 5-point Likert scale to express their degree of agreement with the premises posed. We used the ANOVA test to evaluate whether respondent views significantly varied based on practice location. 240 health care professionals completed the survey. Only three individual queries of 32 showed any significant response variations across practice locations. Overall, viewpoints did not vary across practice locations within question categories on whether the ethics committee or hospital had a role in case resolution, what that role might be and case specific queries. In this multicenter survey study, the viewpoints of health care professionals on the role of ethics committees or hospitals in the resolution of clinical ethics cases varied little based on practice location. (shrink)

Objective Our objective was to evaluate whether those individuals with previous involvement with formal clinical ethics processes differ in their attitudes towards the resolution of prototypical clinical ethics cases than general health care professionals. We hypothesized that those individuals with previous participation in ethics consultation would have significantly different attitudes on the appropriate role of ethics committees in the assessment and resolution of clinical ethical dilemmas than those who have not. Methods We conducted a case-based survey of health care professionals (...) at six US hospitals. We administered the survey to health care professionals in a variety of clinical roles at each center and further sub-categorized these by respondents reporting or not reporting their membership on an ethics committee or participation as an ethics consultant/requestor of ethics consult services. Using the analysis of variance test, we present the variation in attitudes using a 5-point Likert scale with 95% confidence intervals and significance set at p ≤ 0.05. Results A total of 240 respondents completed the survey (response rate: 63.6%) from all six surveyed centers (128 respondents with involvement with ethics consultation, 112 respondents without). Health care professionals not previously involved with formal clinical ethics processes were less likely to view the ethics committee as having a role in resolving the presented clinical ethical dilemmas ( p = 0.01 for analysis of variance comparison). Conclusion In this multi-center survey study, health care providers without previous involvement with formal clinical ethics processes were less likely than those with previous involvement to support a role for ethics committees aiding in ethical case resolution. (shrink)

Encyclopeadic work on the religious and philosophical terms in Hinduism ; includes Sanskrit text of Viṣṇudaśāvatārarahasyadarśikā and Parāśaktigāyatryaṣṭakam with Hindi explanation.

A fundamental difference in Svāmi Saccidānandendra Sarasvatī’s (SSS) and the Post-Śaṅkarādvaitins’ (PSA) exegeses of Advaita Vedānta lies in the pedagogic method of adhyāropa-apavāda (deliberate attribution of characteristics to the attribute-less brahman, and its corresponding/complementary contradiction). For SSS, adhyāropāpavāda is the sole method to negate avidyā (ignorance); other Upaniṣadic methods— lakṣaṇā and netivāda —are subsumed under it. For the PSA, on the other hand, adhyāropāpavāda plays a subsidiary, less consequential role in engendering gnosis; the primary role is that of mahāvākyas (the (...) ‘great’ Vedāntic statements). SSS denounces the PSA—with the sole exception of Sureśvarācārya—for their (purportedly incorrect) interpretation of the method; he contends that it has led to the lamentable reification of concepts in Advaita Vedānta, and ultimately undermined its basic tenets. In this article, I articulate SSS’ position. (shrink)

In India, there has been a shift from using unclaimed bodies to voluntary body donation for anatomy dissections in medical colleges. This study used in-depth qualitative interviews to explore the deeper intent, values and attitudes towards body donation, the body and death, and expectations of the body donor, as well as their next of kin and representative religious scholars. All donors had enrolled in a body bequest programme in a medical school in South India. This study concludes that body donors (...) are philanthropists with deep-rooted values of altruism and service, who are often willing to forgo traditional religious and cultural death rituals. The next of kin are often uncomfortable with the donor’s decision, and this suggests that it is important that dialogue/counselling occurs at the time of the bequest, if the donor’s wishes are to be respected. Religious injunctions are often misinterpreted; this implies that religious leaders/scholars can play a significant role in addressing these misconceptions which are barriers to body donation. Body bequest programmes in India may be enhanced by positioning body donation as ‘daana’—giving without any expectation of return for a higher purpose, including ceremonies of respect in medical colleges. Furthermore, increased public engagement and awareness about body bequest programmes are also important to enhance participation. When medical students internalise what body donors expect of them, i.e. altruism, empathy with patients and becoming ‘good doctors’, it will help to ensure that the donation was not in vain and that the dead truly teach the living. (shrink)

A fundamental difference in Svāmi Saccidānandendra Sarasvatī’s (SSS) and the Post-Śaṅkarādvaitins’ (PSA) exegeses of Advaita Vedānta lies in the pedagogic method of adhyāropa-apavāda (deliberate attribution of characteristics to the attribute-less brahman and its corresponding/complementary contradiction). For SSS, adhyāropāpavāda is the sole method to negate avidyā (ignorance); other Upaniṣadic methods— lakṣaṇā and netivāda —are subsumed under it. For the PSA, on the other hand, adhyāropāpavāda plays a subsidiary, less consequential role in engendering gnosis; the primary role is that of mahāvākyas (the (...) “great” Vedāntic statements). SSS denounces the PSA—with the sole exception of Sureśvarācārya —for their (purportedly incorrect) interpretation of the method; he contends that it has led to the lamentable reification of concepts in Advaita Vedānta and ultimately undermined its basic tenets. In this article, I articulate SSS’ position. (shrink)

STEPHEN TOULMIN George Santayana used to insist that those who are ignorant of the history of thought are doomed to re-enact it. To this we can add a corollary: that those who are ignorant of the context of ideas are doom ed to misunderstand them. In a few self-contained fields such as pure mathematics, concepts and conceptual systems can perhaps be de tached from their historico-cultural situations; so that (for instance) a self-taught Ramanujan, living alone in India, mastered number (...) theory to a point at which he could make major contributions to European mathematics. But elsewhere the situation is different - and, in philosophy, inevitably so. For philosophical ideas and problems confront us like geological specimens in situ; and, in the act of prising them free from their historical and cultural locations, we can too easily forget about the matrix in which they took shape, and end by impossing on them a sculptural form of our own making. Something of this kind has happened in the case of Ludwig Wittgen stein. For his philosophical work has commonly been seen as an episode in the development, either of mathematicallogic, or oftwentieth-century British philosophy. His associations with Frege and Russell, Moore and Waismann, have over-shadowed everything else in his cultural origins and intellectual concerns. (shrink)

G. H. Hardy’s remarkable Indian protégé Srinivasa Ramanujan (1887-1920) is without doubt the most significant mathematician who is known to have solved one of Dudeney’s puzzles. When a student friend at Cambridge read out an arithmetical problem from Dudeney’s “Perplexities” column in the latest issue of The Strand Magazine, specifically the Grand Christmas Double Number of December 1914, Ramanujan solved it straightaway and in a generalised form, without recourse to pencil and paper. The story of this astonishing display (...) of mathematical skill is told in some detail and its supposed implications discussed. (shrink)

The “centre-periphery” relationship historically structured scientific exchanges between metropolis and province, between the fount of empire and its outposts. But the exchange, if regarded merely as a one-way flow of scientific information, ignores both the politics of knowledge and the nature of its appropriation. Arguably, imperial structures do not entirely determine scientific practices and the exchange of knowledge. Several factors neutralise the over-determining influence of politics—and possibly also the normative values of science—on scientific practice.In examining these four examples of Indian (...) scientists in encounters with their peers at the centre, exceptional scientists are seen in a social context where the epistemology of science supposedly describes its practice. Imperialism imposes practices and patronage, which moderate the exchange of scientific knowledge. But, at Level Two, the politics of knowledge and the patterns of patronage within it mediate exchanges between the centre and the periphery.The first step in reconfiguring exchanges between centre and periphery —in this case, between Europe and India during the period 1850 to 1930— is to recognise the relation between the acquisition of resources and the maintenance of legitimacy and identity.67 Political life is not confined to the core of political institutions.68 Second, in examining science as practised in the colonies, it is necessary to see stages of scientific institutions, whose development structures the exchange.From the encounter of Ramchandra and De Morgan, it is evident that the centre-periphery framework should be separated from the models of transmission embedded within it. The notion of “translation” helps to suggest that scientists bring personal motives and meanings to each encounter. Ramchandra, for example, sought a novel method of teaching Indians calculus, while De Morgan's interest lay in finding a place for algebra in a liberal education.The hierarchy inherent in the centre-periphery framework compels the conclusion that, at Level Two, the autodidact outside the institutions of science must have his work presented to scientists at the centre by authoritative figures from the centre. This is not mainly a question of imperialism, but rather of patronage. The peripheral scientist could not be granted direct entry into the collegial circle until his efforts at the periphery could be translated into the language and concerns of the central community. Ramanujan's enigmatic formulas were translated into the language of analysis by Hardy, which enabled the creation of a field to which Hardy was committed. Scientists from the periphery who were already part of the circle by virtue of their training, were not necessarily subject to the same degree of attestation as other scientists from the periphery. P.C. Ray, with his DSc from Edinburgh, and his position at Calcutta University, had less difficulty in winning the trust of colleagues at the centre, even when he returned to India. On the contrary, remaining at the periphery, he moved from a context of patronage to a sphere of competition. In addition, Ray's collegiality, even at Level Two, was more comprehensive, and connected him with Level One.Eventually, the professional Indian science graduate found collegiality within the international community of scientists. Saha's self-imposed progressive nationalism constrained his identification with the centre and made him a potential competitor instead. Once having achieved eminence in the world of science, C.V. Raman and Saha shifted their work to journals of physics published in India in order to further the cause of physics research in their own country.69To go beyond the limitations of the centre-periphery model, it is necessary not merely to examine exchanges between scientists functioning in a “shared epistemological universe”,70 but also to recognise the part played by institutions, the experience of colonialism, and the forms of patronage characterising both colonialism and science. Put another way, although there is relative epistemological autonomy within the disciplinary research communities of science, the interplay between knowledge and power structures this exchange.The scientific links between colonial India and Britain at the turn of the century were mediated by structures which prefigured change. Does structure determine all? If it does, we are left with an Orientalist reconstruction of the docile native, and a passive cultural medium into which science percolates. But this neglects the role of scientists in creating new structures within which they worked. A middle position—one more sensitive to the exigencies of colonial scientific life—would be one where the participants are seen not as the dupes of “structure nor the potentates of action”, but as occupying a ground between the two.71. (shrink)

In this book, best-selling author and mathematician Haim Shapira presents an introduction to mathematical theories which deal with the most beautiful concept ever invented by humankind: infinity. Written in clear, simple language and aimed at a lay audience, this book also offers some strategies that will allow readers to try their ability at solving truly fascinating mathematical problems. Infinity is a deeply counter-intuitive concept that has inspired many great thinkers. In this book we will meet many sages, both familiar and (...) unfamiliar: Zeno and Pythagoras, Georg Cantor and Bertrand Russell, Sofia Kovalevskaya and Emmy Noether, al-Khwarizmi and Euclid, Sophie Germain and Srinivasa Ramanujan. The world of infinity is inhabited by many paradoxes, and so is this book: Zeno paradoxes, Hilbert's "Infinity Hotel", Achilles and the gods paradox, the paradox of heaven and hell, the Ross-Littlewood paradox involving tennis balls, the Galileo paradox and many more. Aimed at the curious but non-technical reader, this book refrains from using any fearsome mathematical symbols. It uses only the most basic operations of mathematics: adding, subtracting, multiplication, division, powers and roots - that is all. But that doesn't mean that a bit of deep thinking won't be necessary and rewarding. Writing with humour and lightness of touch, Haim Shapira banishes the chalky pallor of the schoolroom and offers instead a truly thrilling intellectual journey. Fasten your seatbelt - we are going to Infinity, and beyond! (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:March 13, 2008 (7:35 pm) G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2 054.wpd 272 Reviews 1 See Brian J.yL. Berry and Donald C. Dahmen, “Paul Wheatley, 1921–1999”, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 91 (2001): 734–47. THE LIVES OF THOSE WHO WOULD BE IMMORTAL Richard Henry Schmitt U. of Chicago Chicago, il 60637, usa [email protected] David Leavitt. The Indian Clerk: a Novel. London: Bloomsbury, 2008; New York: Bloomsbury, 2007. Pp. 485. isbn 1-59691-040-2. (...) £16.99; us$24.95 (hb). From the start, this novel interested me for two reasons. First, it attempts to tell us the personal stories of two individuals who were working at the highest level in a very abstract Weld, namely G.yH. Hardy (1877–1947) and Srinivasa Ramanujan (1887–1920) during their collaboration on pure mathematics between spring 1914 and spring 1919. Obviously the same problems would arise in trying to tell the personal story of Bertrand Russell’s supervision of Ludwig Wittgenstein in mathematical logic, which occurred at Cambridge University in the years just before the start of the Great War. It is a great challenge to try to tie personal dynamics and abstract thought into a single coherent narrative. There are implications for the philosophy of mathematics and the history and sociology of science. So, of course, we have to ask: how does author David Leavitt rise to this challenge? Second, a more personal reason: Paul Wheatley1 told me shortly before his death that he thought this period at Cambridge represented the highest accom- March 13, 2008 (7:35 pm) G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2 054.wpd Reviews 273 2 G.yH. Hardy, Ramanujan: Twelve Lectures on Subjects Suggested by His Life and Work (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1940). Two lectures were presented at Harvard in 1936; the Wrst, a more personal recollection, was printed unchanged. The quote is from p. 2. The second lecture was expanded into the remaining published lectures, all considering speciWc mathematical topics. plishment possible for an academic institution: its fellows and masters had managed to attract and then recognize the genius of Ramanujan and Wittgenstein and to admit them to advanced studies without any real academic credentials. Wheatley had been the chair of the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago; so, he knew something about such matters, as he did about many things involving humans, human settlements, and their arrangement in the world. Incidentally, Wheatley himself appeared as a character, Battle, in Ravenstein, Saul Bellow’s roman à clef about Allan Bloom. So, to the extent that Cambridge University just before and during the Great War plays a role here, we want to learn as much as we can about the atmosphere of the place. The Indian Clerk is a historical novelz—zin this case naming actual names, elaborating what we know about real people and occasionally adding Wctional charactersz—zall centered on the extraordinary mathematical genius Ramanujan and his equally extraordinary importation from India to Cambridge. The story is told largely in the third person, by an omniscient narrator, but repeatedly we also have the inner voice of G.yH. Hardy: there are a number of chapters with the indication “New Lecture Hall, Harvard University”, dated 1936, in which Hardy speaks in the Wrst person. In these passages David Leavitt uses parts of the published lectures, along with G.yH. Hardy’s private thoughtsz—zas imagined by Leavittz—zabout this “one romantic incident in my life” and about other matters that still haunt him.2 The novel is thus in some sense more about G.yH. Hardy and his inner life than it is about Srinivasa Ramanujan. The triumph of the novel is its ability to reconstruct and convey in a lively manner the circumstances of the time, the look and smell of the place, the crosscurrents, dynamics, and dislocations of people during these years. Leavitt has woven together a great deal, from many diTerent realms: pre-war meetings of the Apostles, the high table, the pre-war mathematics tripos, the method of collaboration between Hardy and J.yE. Littlewood, Cambridge as military training grounds and as hospital for the wounded, vegetarian cookery, feminism, Hindu... (shrink)

In an essay published in 1989 the distinguished poet and scholar A. K. Ramanujan asked if there was such a thing as "an Indian way of thinking."1 Having formulated his subject as a question, he then spent his opening pages reflecting on whether this question could be posed at all. An extensive study by a leading Japanese scholar of Buddhism, which Ramanujan did not mention, had analyzed the "ways of thinking of Eastern peoples" in a monograph originally completed (...) in 1947 and published in an expanded English translation in 1964.2 An approach such as Hajime Nakamura's may have seemed already outdated by the time Ramanujan wrote; surely, we now know better than to identify patterns of thought... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Ambedkar-Gandhi Debate: On Identity, Community and Justice by Bindu PuriMeena Dhanda (bio)The Ambedkar-Gandhi Debate: On Identity, Community and Justice. By Bindu Puri. Singapore: Springer, 2022. Pp. xv + 266, Paper $119.90, ISBN 978-981-16-8685-6.Written from a philosophical perspective, this ambitious book by Professor Bindu Puri draws attention to an old and well know opposition between two great minds of the last century. The distance between Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (...) (1869--1948) and Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar (1891--1956) surfaced in the political domain when both were engaged in challenging British colonial rule in their respective, unique, and often opposing ways. Faced with a common enemy from whom political independence was sought, both Indian leaders battled with each other to define the meaning of that independence for the masses they represented. How would independence from the British bring freedom and equality to the most underprivileged? Both drew on their understanding of India’s past: Gandhi at pains to revise, reform, and rewrite his complex inheritance with an eye to continuity, and Ambedkar labouring to extract and underline the undeniable, inescapable core, the scourge of caste, which the republic of India would have to break from if genuine freedom and equality were to become attainable goals.Puri’s book addresses these conflicting notions of the past and builds two incommensurable world views underpinning their political positions, thus presenting the political and intellectual rivalry between Gandhi and Ambedkar as ultimately irreconcilable. Their world views are distilled by defining the relationship between underlying conceptions of the self, community and justice. These form the foci of five chapters, each elaborating the difference between the two thinkers. A broad framework of a binary opposition between the “modern” (Ambedkar) and the “Indic” (Gandhi), inspired by authors like D.R. Nagraj and Ashish Nandy, is followed, occasionally allowing for seepage of common elements from one to the other. It is a significant feature of their life histories that both Gandhi and Ambedkar were trained as lawyers, both studied outside British India, and both returned to practice law in British India. In my view, their “modern” training shaped the argumentative methods deployed by both, albeit, when writing in the vernacular, Ambedkar (in Marathi) and Gandhi (in Gujarati), both used appeals to “native” intelligence in dissimilar ways. Ambedkar did not spare the sphere of the “sacred” from critical scrutiny, whereas Gandhi was careful to protect the “sacred” from criticism. [End Page 1]The book makes extensive use of a distinction between “itihaas” and history, borrowed from an essay by Ajay Skaria (2010), “The Strange Violence of Satyagraha: Gandhi, Itihaas, and History.” Both notions are meant to encapsulate the “past,” but apparently in different ways. This crucial distinction, stressing on the meaning of “itihaas” as “it so happened” introduced in Chapter 1 (p. 2) is followed by its extensive deployment in Chapter 2 (pp. 25-53), where Skaria’s essay is first referenced (p. 33). Many of the key references to Gandhi’s writings in this chapter are strikingly identical with those used by Skaria (2010). He, however, has used his own translations of the original Gujarati text of Hind Swaraj into English, carefully explaining the differences between his and Gandhi’s translations into English, but Puri has relied on either the Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi or Hind Swaraj and Other Writings (ed. Anthony Parel). A long quotation from Veyne (1984) seems to be taken from Skaria’s essay—all the ellipses are exactly where Skaria placed them. The interlinkages between key Gandhian concepts—e.g., between satyagraha and atmabal; the importance of “singularity” for itihaas; khaas lakshan and humanity; unilateral obligation (ekpakshi farj); ownmost orientation (swabhava)—are all found in Skaria (2010). The reliance on Ajay Skaria’s interpretations of Gandhi’s idea of samadarshan (seeing things with an equal eye), especially in the context of the Bhagwad Gita continues in chapter 4 (pp. 152-160), in her discussion of “absolute equality,” only this time it is with reference to Skaria’s (2016) Unconditional Equality: Gandhi’s Religion of Resistance.The comparison of Gandhi’s reading of the Gita with orthodox readings by Tilak and Ramanujan (apparently also derived from... (shrink)

I myself became interested in textual work when I began checking the logical rigor of Plato’s Parmenides hypotheses. To my great surprise, the proof patterns were not simply valid, but as woodenly uniform and rigorous as Euclid’s Elements. Such rigor was exactly what a Neo-Platonist like Proclus would have expected, admired, and possibly imposed; it is not paralleled anywhere else in Plato. At that time, it was believed that the three primary manuscripts containing this dialogue—Oxford B, Venice T, and Vienna (...) W—came from a common archetype of a date as late as the fifth century, and that the only other records of the text of any extent—the lemmata in Proclus’ Commentary and the quoted passages in Damascius’ Problems—were, or at least could be, equally late. Only some evidence that the text as the ninth century manuscripts have it had been in this rigid form before the fifth century could finally settle the question of whether it was Plato’s own or that plus stringent re-styling. I thought that if there were traces of independent descent from some earlier archetype or archetypes, a dragnet technique applied to a collection of all the reported variant readings ought to catch them. (shrink)

From the various discussions of Kant’s theoretical philosophy throughout Hegel’s works, it is not difficult to come away with the impression that Hegel thinks that the Kantian categories are derived from experience, and that the method of a “transcendental” investigation of the forms of subjectivity is nothing other than that of generalization upon observation. As early as the 1802-03 essay, Faith and Knowledge, for example, he characterizes the critical philosophy as the “completion and idealization” of Lockean “empirical psychology.” In § (...) 41 of the Encyclopedia he tells us that Kant’s systematization of the “special forms of the a priori element … of thought … is solely based upon psychological and historical grounds.” Moreover, in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, he refers to Kant as going “psychologically,” i.e., “historically,” to work in his accounts of intuition, understanding, and reason in a manner that is “entirely empirical, and not developed out of the concept.”. (shrink)

ch.1. Dialekh'ka esteticheskikh i︠a︡vleniĭ.--ch.2. Dialektika iskusstva.--ch.3. Dialektika Khudozhestvennogo razvitii︠a︡.

Metrical work with Hindi translation on divination.

This is the first scholarly study of Atlas Shrugged, covering in detail the historical, literary, and philosophical aspects of Ayn Rand's magnum opus. Topics explored in depth include the history behind the novel's creation, publication, and reception; its nature as a romantic novel; and its presentation of a radical new philosophy.

Contributed articles on Indic philosophy, Vedic grammer, and classical Sanskrit literature; includes some on the life of Kr̥ṣṇa Mādho Jha, Sanskrit scholar.

I MAKE NO APOLOGIES for writing about this well-worn topic. For, although there has been an enormous amount written about the account Hume gives of the nature of moral evaluation, commentators are as far from agreement as ever. My own contribution to the controversy has, if anything, not only added to the variety of opinions but also has increased the general confusion. For this I must accept some responsibility. I have certainly laid myself open to some misinterpretation, and the view (...) I have so far expressed in print may also need some modification. I shall here attempt to clarify what precisely my view now is, and why I prefer it to some alternative views advanced by those who find my interpretation of this aspect of Hume's philosophy unacceptable. II. Since what I want to defend is in all important respects my earlier interpretation of the Treatise, 2 I shall for the most part, though not exclusively, be concerned with what Hume says in this, his early, but major, work. (shrink)

One group of commentators takes book 10 as determinative and thus tortures the text in book 1 to say the same thing. This position is described as intellectualist or exclusivist and produces certain puzzles in reading Aristotle’s ethical theory. These puzzles are not benign since the privileged position given wisdom in book 10 seems at odds with the discussion of virtue in book 1 and its development in the Nicomachean Ethics as a whole. Indeed, Aristotle appears inconsistent or even contradictory, (...) recommending in these two brief chapters of book 10 a life devoted to contemplation that only grudgingly allows for the necessity of the practical life discussed in such detail in the rest of his ethical works. If this is the case, under what conditions are we expected to forgo contemplation to engage in the various activities of the moral virtues? Since no conditions are spelled out in the text, the range of speculation is confused and ways around the apparent inconsistencies complex. (shrink)